Trends in the Israeli Scene in 2026

In a few days, Israel will enter the year 2026 while the political, security, and economic conditions remain unstable. The current government continues with its existing components, and it is expected, at least for the next six months, that it will not change due to the coalition members' desire to continue. However, this will actually depend on Prime Minister Netanyahu's ability to remain in power if he is officially pardoned or if an agreement based on the main idea of a swap is reached, leading to his departure before the next elections at the end of next year.

Therefore, the situation in Israel will remain as it is, as it is betting on the use of military force in the Gaza Strip, while accepting to continue implementing the Trump plan while maintaining its right to intervene and operate. It will gradually move to test all concerned parties, meaning Israel will not accept the continuation of the current situation in Gaza. It will work to end Hamas's presence on the ground and continue to annex other areas of the Gaza Strip. Violence by settlers in the West Bank will continue, as will the storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque. Israel will move towards more confrontations, especially in Jerusalem, and will seek calm with its neighboring countries, especially Egypt and Jordan, despite ongoing tensions with Egypt on bilateral issues (borders, crossings, gas deal, and others). It will also work to strengthen its presence in southern Syria and build a defined buffer zone.

Israel will call for the completion of regional peace agreements, although it is highly unlikely to engage in a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia. The closest possibility is a security agreement with Syria under pressure from the U.S. administration, confirming that Israel will combine different policies, some of which may be contradictory and unclear, witnessing further transitional shifts and half-scenarios in dealing with expectations. The results of what happened in the past year, 2025, will have repercussions on Israel's internal situation, which will witness further complexities both economically, with significant shifts related to directing allocations to education and civil services, and due to the expanding map of military targets, as reflected in the approval of this year's budget, which is the largest in Israel's history.

It is expected that Israel's internal scene in 2026 will witness further divisions within the Israeli army, especially with growing reservations about the excessive use of military force, requiring a review of many Israeli policies and the positions of political parties and power centers in society.

The religious current will remain active, and the political and media discourse of the Haredim will escalate in the coming period due to the successive issuance of new legislation within the Knesset that includes all components of Israeli society, which suffers from a pivotal crisis requiring comprehensive reform and a national dialogue called for by President Isaac Herzog. However, the Likud bloc has not responded to this call and is expected to stabilize after internal elections that took a long time for leadership positions. This will reflect a trend toward unifying positions before the upcoming elections, which will not witness fundamental changes in the religious and party map. The current opposition figures such as Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett, or Benny Gantz will remain within their frameworks.

It is also expected that U.S.-Israeli relations will remain stable regardless of the details of the relationship, considering that the issue of Israel and its alliance is fully stable in Congress among both the Democratic and Republican parties. This was confirmed by the U.S. National Security Strategy, which outlined clear provisions reflecting the commitment to Israel's security, support for its existence, and stability.

European-Israeli relations are expected to continue fluctuating between engagement, rejection, and reservations amid the European stance on Gaza's settlement and the anticipated European role in reconstructing the sector and direct participation in some arrangements, including those related to the Rafah crossing and subsequent steps concerning the Palestinian reality and the ability to deal with concerned parties. Israel will continue to face difficult choices in the region unless it abandons its escalating military tendencies and stops threatening the entire region, especially since what happens in the Arab region and Israel's neighboring countries will be dealt with based on considering Israel a state threatening stability, which will halt or freeze ongoing movements.

Israel will enter 2026 burdened with many difficult and complex files that require solutions and settlements rather than relying on force in current and potential challenges not only in Gaza but also in Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. Additionally, it will attempt to reach a new concept of national security on which it can build in the coming period, whether regionally or beyond. It will face a real dilemma of indecision or lack of resolution amid a hostile environment that does not see Israel as a partner state to engage with but rather as an adversarial party. Therefore, the regional peace project will remain postponed for the time being, and talk of collective action or Israel's acceptance in the Arab environment will be delayed, with no progress at any level of Arab or regional dealings until further notice.