Berri Leads the Shiites to the 'Best Possible' Outcome

When Hezbollah, backed by Iran, decided to engage in the "Support War" in the fall of 2023, as part of the "Unity of Arenas" (Lebanon, Assad's Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza), they were effectively negotiating with Israel. War itself is a negotiation by fire. Usually, when the fire consumes its fuel, diplomatic messages are sent and negotiations begin behind closed doors. This happened a year ago when mediators succeeded in stopping the major war and producing the Naqoura Agreement, which laid the foundation for the ongoing negotiations today, gradually shifting from a low-level, primitive military stage to a sophisticated and complex civilian level.

Two years ago, the decision for war was in the hands of Khamenei in Tehran and Hezbollah's Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon, and President Nabih Berri and the Amal Movement had no role in the war. However, after Nasrallah's absence and due to the devastating blows that affected the Shiite reality in the war, it was natural for Berri's role to emerge as a firefighter or rescuer. There has always been a division of roles within the "Shiite duo" during times of war and crises. Hezbollah specializes in military matters, while Berri specializes in negotiation. It has been customary for tight coordination between the two wings to ensure their mutual interests. Just as Amal had no military role during the war, Hezbollah has no role today in the negotiations. Both sides coordinate every step.

However, this does not negate a significant shift within this equation last September when Nasrallah was assassinated, and Hezbollah was forced to agree to an agreement that heavily favored Israel and completely ended Hezbollah's military activity. As a result, and with Sheikh Naim Qassem taking over Hezbollah's leadership, Berri's influence within the duo strongly increased for two main reasons: first, the decline of the "military phase," possibly permanently, in favor of political negotiation; second, Qassem did not fill the void left by Nasrallah, meaning he did not achieve the balance that would make him an equal leader alongside Berri.

Therefore, Berri's role gradually grew over the past two years as the Shiite reference in Lebanon, reaching its peak weeks ago when he sent his right-hand man, MP Ali Hassan Khalil, to Tehran to inform senior officials there of the growing dangers facing the community in Lebanon. He was preceded by the Shiite authority in Najaf, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who sent a message to Khamenei carrying the same content: Lebanese Shiites are in danger, so do not burden them beyond their capacity to endure.

It is rumored that there is a divergence among Iranian officials in their approach to this issue. Some have been convinced of the necessity to allow the community in Lebanon to manage its affairs in a way that prevents existential danger, while others believe that protecting the community does not come through endless concessions but by insisting on confrontation. In reality, Berri and Qassem face a difficult challenge today: how to show flexibility that removes Israel's pretexts for launching a devastating new war without making concessions that approach surrender? It is true what hardliners in Tehran say that Israel demands greater concessions each time it receives one until it eventually gets everything. But it is also true what advocates of diplomacy say that stubbornness against Israel will give it the pretext to launch a devastating war that destroys the entire Shiite environment in Lebanon, allowing it to impose a state of surrender.

What President Berri is doing today is trying to reconcile these two lines. He is essentially trying to use diplomacy to stop the community from losing its military gains, i.e., Hezbollah's weapons, and its political gains, i.e., Shiite influence within the state. He is even trying to prepare a deal sponsored by the Americans, French, and Arabs that guarantees the Shiites gains in Lebanon's future, especially in politics and the economy, such as the electoral law, institutional structure, public utilities, and vital sectors. The military power will be completely relinquished in southern Litani but will remain "contained" in other areas, meaning the "glow" of weapons remains present to always have political effects. Some have interpreted the quorum provided for the last legislative session as a green light from Arab and international parties in favor of Berri, encouraging him to proceed with the deal.

Some say that what really matters to Israel in the coming phase is to eliminate any threat to it, now and for years to come. This can be ensured by clearing weapons from southern Litani or Al-Awali and removing all heavy weapons and drones from northern Litani. Israel is not disturbed if Hezbollah retains weapons in northern Al-Awali of a type that does not pose a threat, kept in specific locked warehouses under the supervision of the Lebanese army and possibly Arab and international oversight.

It is clear that Berri, seasoned in politics, is managing the Shiite affairs in a realistic direction. To prevent settlements from slipping out of his hands and being concluded by others, he hastens to extend lines in all internal and external directions. In the end, if a deal is necessary to end the current crisis, Berri believes it is better for him to sponsor this deal, even if painful, to oversee its birth from a position of strength and to ensure the "duo" gains the greatest possible benefits, because leaving it to others may mean total loss militarily, politically, economically, and administratively.