Analysts: Complexities Obstruct Transition to Second Phase of Gaza Agreement

Analysts have revealed significant political and security complexities that prevent moving to the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement, amid ongoing Israeli violations and divergent international positions regarding the formation of the international stability force and the technocratic government scheduled to manage the sector in the upcoming phase.

Douglas Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, told the Al Jazeera Mubasher evening program on Friday that the main challenge to implementing the second phase lies in the absence of a genuine ceasefire, noting that Israel violated the truce, making any political progress extremely difficult.

Bandow added that Washington faces several obstacles, the most prominent being the disarmament of Hamas, which the movement rejects as a condition for moving to the second phase, in addition to disagreements over the formation of the stability force, amid Israel's objection to Turkey's participation and its desire for the force not to be involved in any disarmament tasks.

The researcher criticized the continuation of Israeli military operations and the prevention of humanitarian aid from entering Gaza, pointing out that this completely contradicts any talk of peace or a technocratic government, noting that children in the sector are dying due to bombing, cold, and the prevention of relief.

Regarding the American role, Bandow considered that the administration of President Donald Trump has so far not exerted any real pressure on the Israeli government and has not threatened sanctions despite ongoing violations, affirming that Washington must recognize that Israel is the party obstructing the implementation of the agreement's provisions by continuing the raids.

Three Key Issues

In his analysis of the prospects for the second phase, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Khatib, professor of International Conflict Management at the Doha Institute, said that the ongoing talks in Miami must resolve three key issues: the first is the nature and powers of the international stability force, so that it does not become a new occupying force but is limited to maintaining calm and stability in the sector.

Al-Khatib added that the second issue concerns the composition of this force, amid Israeli objections to Turkey's participation, which requires resolution through consultations between Washington and regional mediators, especially Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey. The third issue relates to the timelines for reconstruction, the entry of humanitarian aid, and setting a clear deadline for implementing the second phase.

Al-Khatib confirmed that the decisive factor remains the extent of the Trump administration's willingness to pressure Israel, noting that Tel Aviv seeks to impose the disarmament of Hamas without making any concessions related to military withdrawal, although Trump's plan clearly stipulates a gradual Israeli withdrawal with the start of the second phase.

He pointed out that the continuation of Israeli air and artillery strikes despite the agreement reflects an attempt by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—wanted by the International Criminal Court—to impose a new reality in Gaza, even if international forces are present, warning that Washington's failure to curb these violations could lead either to a return to war or to the entrenchment of a fragile security reality.

Formation of a Technocratic Committee

For his part, Ambassador Hussein Hreidi, former Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, explained that there is a prior preliminary agreement between Palestinian factions and the Authority on forming a technocratic committee or a community support committee of 10 members unaffiliated with any factions to manage the transitional phase, denying knowledge of any official retreat from this understanding.

Regarding the international stability force, Hreidi pointed out that its tasks are stipulated in a United Nations Security Council resolution issued last October and annexed to the American president's plan, noting that there are Egyptian, Qatari, and Turkish observations on how this force is formed and structured, with consultations ongoing about the participating countries.

Rejection of Turkey's Participation

In the same context, Turkish military analyst Yusuf Al-Abarda said that Israel's rejection of Turkey's participation in the stability force lacks any legitimacy, stressing that Gaza is not Israeli territory and that Tel Aviv has no right to decide the parties involved in the agreement.

Al-Abarda added that Israel seeks to obstruct the second phase because it means the existence of an international mechanism to monitor violations, which would reveal the party violating the ceasefire, affirming that the delay in forming the stability force aims to buy time and continue imposing facts on the ground.

At the end of the discussion, the guests agreed that the success of the second phase of the agreement depends on resolving issues related to Israeli withdrawal, the nature of the stability force, and the form of civil administration in Gaza, in addition to providing real guarantees for a ceasefire and preventing repeated violations, warning that failure in this regard could return the sector to escalation or entrench a long-term state of instability.