Draft to Rescue the Damascus Agreement - 'SDF' Before Year-End: Decentralization Without Constitutional Guarantees

More than a year after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, Syria continues to face fundamental challenges in rebuilding the state, consolidating identity, and social cohesion. The relationship between the government in Damascus, led by Ahmad al-Shara, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stands out as the most complex test facing the comprehensive political process.

The March 10, 2025 agreement, signed by al-Shara and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi in Damascus, marked a turning point in terms of its timing after the coastal events and its outcomes, including a comprehensive ceasefire, integration of the SDF's civil and military institutions into state institutions, and recognition of the rights of all Syrians to political participation without discrimination, including Kurds. However, as the deadline for implementing the agreement approaches at the end of this year, it can be said that the path is longer and more complicated than just a formal commitment.

From a Historic Agreement to an Implementation Draft

The idea of integrating the SDF into the Syrian state has been a political dream amid fundamental contradictions since the early days. The political agreement was not accompanied by practical details on how to integrate the SDF's self-defense forces into the new Syrian army composed of factions with diverse ideologies and loyalties, how to manage local resources and rights, or how to draft constitutional guarantees protecting the rights of Kurds and other components within the structure of these forces and their areas of control.

With the announced deadline by Washington for implementing the agreement nearing, and amid the deadlock the process has suffered in recent months, the co-chair of the Relations Office in the Movement for a Democratic Society (MSD) — the political wing of the Autonomous Administration — Hassan Mohammed revealed a draft agreement recently presented by Damascus. This draft is a genuine attempt to partially resolve disputes but, more importantly, to save the agreement and create an opportunity to announce substantial progress in a real test arena for two different wills in building the new Syrian state.

Looking at its provisions, the draft presented by Damascus practically acknowledged that the complete dismantling of the SDF is not a realistic option. Instead, Damascus adopted a formula of gradual integration within the framework of the Syrian National Army, while maintaining the presence of three main military divisions distributed across Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah, all subject to the Ministry of Defense and the general command.

This arrangement means the SDF transforms from an independent force into an integrated force within the Syrian army, representing a strategic shift in the nature of the relationship between the two parties.

The relative presence of units such as the Women's Battalion and the Special Forces in the draft reflects Damascus's awareness of the symbolic sensitivity associated with these entities within Kurdish society. However, it limits their ability to be independent organizations with executive powers outside the central military command of the state.

The March 10 agreement had previously led to ground moves such as withdrawals from Aleppo towards the east of the Euphrates and the reorganization of the Asayish units as part of the public security under the supervision of central authorities, along with the release of prisoners exchanged between the two sides. This indicates that, despite the slow pace, practical steps have been accomplished previously in this path, thus increasing the chances of the agreement's future success.

One of the fundamental issues still disputed between the two sides is the system of governance. Leaks about the draft indicate Damascus's readiness to grant the Autonomous Administration administrative decentralization in the northern and eastern Syrian provinces with expanded powers to manage affairs in education, health, and local services.

These extensive administrative powers appear to be an attempt to ease fears of absolute centralization in Damascus, but they remain within the sovereignty of the Syrian state, which retains the final decision on broader sovereign matters such as foreign policy, national security, and strategic resources.

This balance between broad local powers and strong central authority raises questions about whether the proposed decentralization will meet the SDF's demands, especially since some parties within the Autonomous Administration continuously assert that decentralization without clear constitutional guarantees could be mere ink on paper at the first political crisis.

Damascus confirms its readiness to introduce constitutional amendments guaranteeing the rights of all Syrians without explicitly referring to the cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurds, with indications of the possibility of adopting Kurdish as a secondary language of instruction in predominantly Kurdish areas. This can be considered progress in the history of relations between the Syrian state and the Kurdish component, but it remains centrally conditional on preserving the unity of the state and rejecting any model of autonomy or political decentralization.

There is no doubt that constitutional amendments are the cornerstone of the future relationship between Damascus and the SDF, especially since many analysts loyal to the Autonomous Administration believe that any military or administrative integration not based on a clear constitutional framework will be prone to rapid collapse under political or security pressure. This is why the SDF focuses during its negotiation rounds on the necessity of including this dimension at the core of the agreement and considering it a fundamental guarantee of independence from any return to traditional centralization policies.

Sources contacted by An-Nahar within the SDF indicate an approach that treats the draft as a historic opportunity to protect gains, while insisting simultaneously on obtaining guarantees to continue negotiating the core differences represented by the constitutional framework and demands for democratizing Syrian society.

According to these sources, leaders in the Autonomous Administration see that the success of the draft and completing its implementation, alongside empowering internal and external alliances, can enhance their political and social position within the new Syria. This approach depends on a complex reading of the regional scene, where international powers, especially the United States, still retain direct influence over the Syrian peace process.

Political Pressure and Ongoing Turkish Warning

Turkey remains the most sensitive regional player regarding the SDF file, considering it a security threat. Statements by its officials, especially Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, expressing impatience with delays in implementing the March 10 agreement and linking the opening of border crossings to the implementation of integration, indicate that Ankara still views integration as a means to end the SDF rather than a political settlement.

Statements and moves within Turkey's political majority, most recently remarks by the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, Devlet Bahçeli, which hinted at the possibility of joint military action against the SDF if full compliance is not achieved, show that Turkey still holds the "military threat" card as part of its strategy regarding northern Syria. This complicates the task of implementing the agreement and increases the risks of failure.

On the other hand, al-Shara's visit to Washington and his meeting with President Donald Trump, along with the lifting of sanctions on Syria, represented a political boost for the transitional government. However, it came amid a still fluctuating American stance towards the SDF.

After the pressure created by statements from the US special envoy Tom Barrett that "federalism has not succeeded in the region" on the SDF, Druze, Alawites, and other parties rejecting centralized rule in Syria, the Tadmur attack that resulted in American casualties reshuffled the cards again, emphasizing the need to continue partnership with the SDF and to be cautious in the integration process.

At the end of 2025, the question remains open: Will Damascus and the SDF achieve strategic integration, or will this step remain within the limits of accomplishing something before the deadline expires?